It has to be admitted that Rockets general manager Stone has operated "ghost spirits" in the past five years!

When the Rockets signed Oakge with a minimum salary of 3.1 million yuan per year and used the last 1.2 million yuan in salary space, the entire league suddenly realized: Stone completed a magic trick from ruins to peak in three years. This general manager, who was once ridiculed for being "only good at playing badly", used a series of "ghost" operations to bring the Rockets from the bottom of the West to the championship favorite - Harden's bargaining chips, Wall's decisive decision to buy out, Uduka's risky employment, Amen's draft betting, and then this offseason's "10 God-level operations", each step seems plain, but in fact it has deep meaning. "Precise bomb disposal" during the reconstruction period: when Stone took over the Rockets in 2021, the team was in chaos with Harden forcing the palace to leave the team. The Rockets at that time were like a bomb about to explode - Harden's transaction value continued to decline with passive slack work, Wall's 40 million contract became a laughing stock in the league, and the locker room was even more chaotic. Stone's first step showed the essence of his "ghost spirit": when Harden clearly wanted to leave, he did not panic, but waited patiently for the best offer, and finally reached a deal with the Nets to exchange for 4 first-round picks.

It is more courageous to handle Wall's contract. At that time, Wall made it clear that he was "unwilling to be a substitute for young players", and this attitude was fatal to the team during the reconstruction period. Stone did not hesitate and decided to buy out - although this meant paying Wall's remaining huge salary, he knew that a rebuilding team must not let the veteran's negative emotions affect the young people. After buying out Wall, the Rockets were able to establish the "Temini" framework between Porter Jr. and Jaylen Green, clearing obstacles for the subsequent tactical system.

Later, Porter Jr. left the team due to domestic violence. It seemed to be an operational mistake, but in fact it proved Stone's foresight. He never regarded Porter Jr. as a long-term core, but only as a stopgap measure for the transitional stage. This "no love and no obsession" attitude has allowed the Rockets to avoid many common mistakes made by teams during the reconstruction period - wasting time and salary space for players with mediocre potential.

The "VC" of the coaching team: exchange for disputes for system

In terms of coach selection, Stone's operations are more "ghostly". He first signed Silas for 2 million US dollars in four years as a transition, strictly restricting his authority and record requirements - this seems to be saving money, but in fact it is paving the way for subsequent coach change. Silas' "free-stocking" coaching just exposed all problems for young players, providing accurate targets for Uduka's system reform. The decision to hire Uduka in 2023 caused a stir at that time. This coach, who was banned by the Celtics for the "Peach Sex Incident", is capable but has extremely high risks. But Stone saw the value that others could not see: Uduka's iron-blooded defensive concept is what the Rockets with a poor discipline most need; he built the Celtic defensive system (No. 1 in the 2022 Celtics' defensive efficiency league), proving his ability to transform defensive theory into actual combat; more importantly, Uduka, who is burdened with controversy, urgently needs to prove himself and will be more devoted than other famous coaches.

It turns out that this is a great deal. In his first season as Uduka coach, the Rockets' defensive efficiency jumped from 29th in the league to 9th, and reached 4th last season (When Jaylen Green was not on the court, the defensive efficiency was 2nd in the league). What he brought was not only tactics, but also discipline - Dillon's "mouth cannon" stimulated the team's vitality, Amen's defensive focus increased significantly, and even Shen Jing's pick-and-roll quality has improved significantly. Stone's transition cost of 2 million + a middle-class contract implanted a winning culture for the Rockets, and the return rate of this "VC" is the top of the league. "Reverse thinking" in the draft: Stone's operation at the draft without the popularity perfectly interprets "I am afraid of others greed, and I am greedy." Before the 2023 draft, Ossell Thompson and Coolibaly were popular on the front line, and almost all experts predicted that the Rockets would pick one of them at a high position. But Stone sided with the public opinion and chose Amen Thompson with the No. 4 draw - this decision was scolded at the time, but now it has become a stroke of magic.

Amen's potential is gradually being realized. His defensive coverage (2.3 steals per game in the summer league), organizational vision (6.7 assists per game) and off-ball awareness perfectly fits modern basketball's requirements for "organizing forwards". ESPN's scout report has compared it to a "young version of Pippen", believing that his defensive diversity and passing ability can bring the Rockets' forward rotation to a higher level. More importantly, Amen's contract is extremely cost-effective - as the No. 4 pick, his annual salary is only 4.2 million yuan, but he can provide All-Star defensive value.

Compared with Ossell Thompson (Pistols) and Kulibaly (Eagles) of the same class, Amen's development trajectory is more in line with the needs of the Rockets. Although Osell has outstanding physical talent, his shooting shortcomings are obvious; Kulibali's offensive efficiency continues to decline. Stone's "reverse thinking" allows the Rockets to pick up the puzzle that is most suitable for the system among the options that are not favored.

Shepard was also very exquisite in this year's draft. At that time, the Rockets already had Amen and Ethan, and it seemed that they didn't need another striker to swing, but Stone was interested in Shepard's "immediate combat power" - his ability to catch and shoot, which could fill the vacancy of Jaylen Green after leaving the team in the future. This "not greedy for heights and emphasis on adaptation" draft philosophy has allowed the Rockets to avoid the "talent superstition" mistakes that many young teams often make..

"Extreme Operation" in the offseason: 10 transactions to create a championship lineup

During this offseason, Stone's 10 operations completed the transformation from "rebuilding team" to "champion favorite". Each transaction accurately hits the team's shortcomings, but does not exceed the salary space limit - this ability to "make a dojo in a snail shell" can be regarded as a textbook-level operation at the league.

His operation logic is clear and fatal:

Retain the core of the system: 3 years, 39 million renewal of Adams (rebounds and pick-and-roll), 2 years, 50 million renewal of Van Vritte (control and three-pointers), 5 years, 122 million renewal of Jabbarri Smith Jr. (space type 4 position). These three are the foundation of the Uduka system.

Complete the thickness of the inside line: sign first and then exchange to welcome Capela back, adding the basket frame protection and cake-eating options at the lowest cost - the "Three Towers" composed of Capela, Shinkyung and Adams, which can deal with opponents of different styles.

Solve the offensive hard solution: Send Jaylen Green + Brooks + No. 10 + second round in exchange for Durant. This deal seems to sacrifice youth talent, but in fact it is "abandoning the pass and protecting the car" - Jaylen Green's poor performance last season's playoffs (13.3 points per game, 37% + 29.5% shooting) proved that he was embarrassed, and Durant's arrival (52% + 43% shooting rate in health) directly improved the Rockets' ability at critical moments.

Strengthen the depth of the front line: 53 million signed Finney Smith in 4 years, renewing Jeff Green, Holiday, Tate and Oakge with a basic salary, so that the Rockets' forward depth reaches the top level in the league - from Durant to Oakge, it can provide all-round coverage from scoring to defense.

The most "ghostly" thing is salary control. The Rockets' total salary next season is $194.7 million, only 1.2 million away from the hard salary cap, and they can sign 14 formal contract players. This ability to "spend a penny in half" makes many team general managers far beyond the reach - you know, the contracts of Durant, Van Vritte and Jabbarri Jr. alone account for 60% of the salary space, but Stone can use the remaining money to fill 11 role players, and each position has at least two reliable rotations. The "terror balance" of the final form: an integrated offense and defense + a series of operations that deeply crushed Stone, ultimately creating a "no shortcomings". The lineup depth and tactical adaptability of the new season have reached a terrifying balance.

The evolution of the defensive end best reflects Stone's vision. Uduka's defensive system requires two types of players: a forward line that can switch to multiple positions, and an inside line that can protect the frame. Finney Smith (15th in the league in defensive efficiency last season), Oakge (106 in career defensive efficiency in career), and Amen (2.3 steals per game in summer league), perfectly meeting the first type of needs; Capela (1.8 blocks per game in career) and Adams (23% rebounding rate last season) solved the second type of problems.

The Rockets' defensive efficiency has risen to 4th in the league last season, and Jaylen Green is second in the league when he is not present. With the further upgrade of defensive resources in the new season, they are fully capable of rushing to the top three in the league - imagine: Amen + Ethan + Finney Smith + Durant + Jabarri Jr.'s "Death Five" lineup can defend from No. 1 to No. 5, and this kind of defensive coverage area is unique in the league. The

offensive end improvement is also significant. Durant's arrival directly solved the Rockets' biggest shortcoming - hard-solving ability at critical moments. The Rockets lost many times in a stalemate last season because of the lack of "big heart" players who can score stably. Durant averaged 26.6 points per game last season and shot 54% at critical moments. Scorers of this level can improve the Rockets' offense to a higher level.

What's even better is the flexibility of the lineup. Uduka can not only play the "two towers" of Shen Jing + Adams to fight a positional battle, but also send the "Death Five Front" to fight a fast break counterattack; it can not only allow Van Vreut to play tactical cooperation, but also allow Durant to create opportunities with the ball and singles. This ability of "multi-style switching" makes it difficult for opponents to arrange targeted defense.

ESPN's evaluation came to the nail on the head: "No team in the league can compete with the Rockets' depth of the front line." From Durant to Oakge, the Rockets' forward line includes scorers, defensive engineers, and organizational players - this "everyone can play and everyone has characteristics" lineup is the standard for the champion team.

Conclusion:

Stone's operation seems dull, but in fact every step is on the point: during the reconstruction period, it does not blindly pursue the "star effect", but instead hoards draft picks and practical players; when changing coaches, it does not believe in "big-name coaches", but chooses the most suitable Uduka; when strengthening, it does not seek to be big and complete, but accurately hits the shortcomings. Today's Rockets have both superstars like Durant, as well as young players such as Jabbarri and Ethan, as well as Uduka's defensive system as the foundation - this combination of "old, middle-aged and young" is the best proof of Stone's "ghost spirit" operation. The Rockets in the new season may really make the suspense of the new season's championship smaller and smaller as the outside world predicts.